Is Mexico's Judicial Reform a Democratic Innovation or Constitutional Crisis?
Is Mexico's judicial reform an attempt to undermine democracy with….democracy?

Democracy is changing worldwide, and the transformations we witness extend far beyond any single nation's borders. Mexico stands at a constitutional crossroads, implementing a judicial reform unprecedented in modern democratic history. While President Claudia Sheinbaum enjoys substantial public support and diplomatic resilience, her administration's judicial overhaul raises fundamental questions about the balance between democratic participation and institutional independence.
Mexico has become the first country to implement popular elections for its entire judiciary, from Supreme Court justices to local magistrates. This sweeping reform, originally proposed by former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador and now championed by his successor, represents a radical departure from traditional judicial appointment systems. Proponents frame this initiative as creating "the most democratic country in the world," emphasizing direct citizen participation in judicial selection.
An independent judiciary serves as democracy's referee, checking both legislative and executive branches. By design, judicial systems worldwide remain insulated from political winds through appointments rather than elections. If judges must campaign for office, they risk becoming another class of politicians seeking popular positions, problematic when constitutional rights and minority protections lack popular support.
The reform's democratic veneer masks significant structural concerns. Judicial candidates must secure approval from the ruling Morena party, which holds commanding congressional majorities. This transforms judicial selection from a merit-based process into partisan vetting, potentially compromising judicial independence.
Former President Ernesto Zedillo, who led Mexico's transition from single-party rule in the 1990s, has characterized this reform as a fundamental threat to judicial autonomy and professionalism, a critique carrying particular weight given his role in democratizing Mexican institutions.
Mexico's transformation fits within a disturbing international trend. As CNN's Fareed Zakaria has observed, populist leaders worldwide systematically weaken court systems through various mechanisms.
The American judicial system faces unprecedented pressures under Trump, including strategic loyalist appointments, threats to prosecute opponents, and promises to weaponize the Justice Department. Trump's "dictator on day one" declarations and "deep state" criticisms signal fundamental challenges to judicial independence, while January 6th pardons and prosecutor threats demonstrate executive power weaponization.
Internationally, Israel's Netanyahu pursues legislation limiting Supreme Court oversight, triggering a constitutional crisis. India's Modi expands government influence over judicial appointments. Turkey's Erdoğan purged thousands of judges post-2016, creating a beholden judiciary. Poland attempted Supreme Court restructuring before facing EU sanctions, while Hungary's Orbán packed courts with loyalists.
This global pattern suggests Mexico's reform shares concerning similarities with worldwide judicial erosion, framing such changes as democratic innovations while concentrating control within ruling parties.
The fundamental tension lies in applying electoral logic to judicial functions. Political scientist Denise Dresser observes that this risks converting the rule of law into a "popularity contest." Justice traditionally depends on legal expertise, constitutional interpretation, and political insulation, qualities potentially incompatible with electoral campaigns and popular mandates.
Can judicial independence coexist with direct democratic selection? Does popular legitimacy enhance judicial effectiveness or compromise courts' counter-majoritarian role in protecting minority rights and constitutional principles?
The reform's timing coincides with a broader global crisis of judicial independence. While potentially increasing public engagement, it risks undermining the separation of powers that underpins constitutional government. Concentrating appointment authority within a single party, combined with electoral pressures, could fundamentally alter the judiciary's role as an independent check on power.
As institutions worldwide face similar pressures, from Trump's return to ongoing restructuring in Poland and Hungary, Mexico's experiment may serve as either a cautionary tale or an unfortunate precedent for democratic backsliding disguised as popular empowerment.
Mexico's judicial experiment represents both democratic innovation and potential constitutional crisis within a global context of eroding judicial independence. The parallels with pressures in the United States, Europe, and other regions suggest this is not isolated but part of a broader trend toward executive capture of judicial institutions.
As this system takes shape, Mexico's experience will serve as a crucial case study for those concerned about balancing democratic legitimacy with institutional independence. The stakes extend beyond Mexico's borders: where judicial independence faces threats from Washington to Warsaw, this experiment may influence how nations approach the fundamental tension between popular sovereignty and constitutional governance.
The height of irony would be voters using democracy's tools to undermine democratic government itself. As the international community watches Mexico navigate this territory, outcomes will offer insights into whether direct democracy can coexist with judicial independence and whether democratic institutions can survive the populist challenge.
There are problems with both judicial appointment and judicial election of judges. Both of these systems are not insulated from the corrosive effects of corruption. The only way to fully ensure judicial independence is no matter which system is utilized, the whole government must be actually honest, perceived to be honest and committed to abiding by judicial decrees. An autocratic government is incapable of tolerating an independent judiciary. Corruption is a tool of autocrats to maintain a patronage system they can control. Courts are perfect for this.
Mexico has a problem with corruption. So does the US now. As far as I am concerned, our court system has lost the respect of the people because of Trump. As long as the executive is autocratic and/or corrupt, judicial independence won't be believed, even if it exists. If the president doesn't respect the law, then the people won't. With Trump pardoning criminals and being elevated to office despite his criminal background, the rule of law has very little credibility. A similar dynamic could play out in Mexico, although I don't know the corruption state of play in the Sheinbaum administration. Courts will be seen as mere conduits for the executive branch's will.
That said, if one is discussing judicial independence in the context of an ethical government, the Missouri Plan is considered about the best we can do to insulate judges from the machinations of politics. So, of course, it is ignored by politicians.